Operation Downfall, Part I

As 1944 turned into 1945 an Allied vic­tory in the Pacific was creep­ing closer to real­ity. Lit­tle by lit­tle Amer­i­can forces were rolling up the Japan­ese defenses one island at a time as they pushed the invaders back fur­ther and fur­ther towards the Japan­ese main­land. Guam had been taken, the Philip­pines were being con­tained and bomb­ing on Iwo Jima was under­way. In this atmos­phere of cau­tious opti­mism the ideas for Oper­a­tion Down­fall, as it would be called, were being hashed out by the Com­bined Chiefs of Staff at the Arg­onaut Conference((The code­name for The Yalta Con­fer­ence, the 1945 wartime meet­ing between Franklin D. Roo­sevelt, Win­ston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin)) held on the tiny island of Malta in the Mediter­ranean. The con­fer­ence called for the defeat of Japan within eigh­teen months of the sur­ren­der of Ger­many, and this would entail a pos­si­ble amphibi­ous land­ing on the Japan­ese main­land itself. At the time the Man­hat­tan Project was a closely guarded secret so the mem­bers at the con­fer­ence didn’t even take its exis­tence into account.

The con­fer­ence had many other fac­tors to think about also. How could they force an uncon­di­tional Japan­ese sur­ren­der with the least amount of Allied casu­al­ties in the short­est period of time? Orig­i­nally a joint British-American team had writ­ten a doc­u­ment enti­tled “Appre­ci­a­tion and Plan for the Defeat of Japan” where they didn’t fore­see an inva­sion until after 1947 but the con­fer­ence felt that drag­ging the war out that far would have dan­ger­ous con­se­quences to Amer­i­can morale at home. And not only would the Allies face Japan­ese mil­i­tary units but also a “fanat­i­cally hos­tile pop­u­la­tion”. Fight­ing the Japan­ese mil­i­tary was one thing, fac­ing an entire pop­u­la­tion armed with var­i­ous weapons car­ry­ing out ban­zai attacks was another. The death toll on both sides could have been tremendous.

In light of this the US Navy urged a sea block­ade and air­power to bring about sur­ren­der. The US Army Air Force, using cap­tured air­bases in China and Korea would be able to bom­bard Japan into submission.((A sea block­ade had helped the US defeat another enemy roughly 80 years pre­vi­ous to this — The Con­fed­er­ate States of Amer­ica.)) The US Army, though, believed that the strat­egy could pro­long the war for an inde­ter­mi­nate amount of time and need­lessly waste lives. In light of this the Army’s opin­ion won out.

And so plan­ning on the two-part inva­sion began. It was to be bro­ken into two oper­a­tions, Olympic and Coro­net with Olympic sched­uled to begin on X-Day — Novem­ber 1, 1945.((Info for this post came from both Mil­i­tary His­tory Ency­clo­pe­dia on the Web and Wikipedia.))

We’ll talk about the first phase, Olympic, next time.

02. July 2008 by Glenn Vance
Categories: History | 1 comment

One Comment

  1. Pingback: Operation Downfall, Part II : glennvance.com

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